In September 2022, a resident of Mala Rohan near Kharkiv found the barely buried bodies of people in Russian uniforms near his home. Boots protruded from the soil, and a short army shovel lay nearby. Two more deceased individuals were discovered in a well, and a third at a neighbor's house. Documents and chevrons left after the battle linked this location to the 138th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade – Military Unit 02511 from Kamenka, Leningrad Oblast.

By that time, the unit had already withdrawn from near Kharkiv, received reinforcements, and returned to the war. Relatives called hospitals and morgues, searched for people by tattoos and photographs, while official bodies did not even publish the total number of dead, wounded, and captured. One officer at the funeral of a 19-year-old contract soldier said that more than 300 other people had died with him, but the state did not provide any open list for Military Unit 02511.

In the spring of 2024, the brigade was expanded into the 69th Guards Motorized Rifle Division. Military Unit 02511's number, headquarters in Kamenka, historical regalia, and command were retained. A few weeks later, the formation was thrown into Vovchansk. There, videos of small assault groups reappeared, stories of dozens of casualties, and Ukrainian statements about the loss of most of its previous personnel.

This article does not combine all estimates into one striking figure. It shows something else: how a unit with a pre-war history of violence, heavy losses near Kharkiv, and failures in personnel accounting became the basis for a new division. The organization grew. Public accountability for its previous composition did not arise.

What is Military Unit 02511

Military Unit 02511 is stationed in the village of Kamenka, Vyborgsky District, Leningrad Oblast. Until 2024, the 138th Separate Guards Krasnoselskaya Order of Lenin Red Banner Motorized Rifle Brigade existed under this number. It was part of the 6th Combined Arms Army and included several motorized rifle battalions, a tank battalion, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, and support units.

The formation traces its official history back to the 70th Rifle Division, formed in 1934. Soviet awards, the "Guards" title, and an honorary designation became the basis of the unit's public image. In local chronicles, Kamenka appears as a guardian of military glory near Leningrad. In the biographies of living servicemen, it had a different reputation for decades.

In 1997, the 45th Guards Motorized Rifle Division was reduced to the 138th Brigade. In 2024, the process was reversed: the 69th Motorized Rifle Division was formed on the basis of the brigade. Therefore, the same military unit number denotes structures of different scales and several generations of personnel. The increase in the number on paper does not allow for the conclusion that the former brigade retained its personnel core.

During the war, people from other units were seconded to Kamenka's subdivisions, and new contract soldiers and mobilized personnel were recruited. This complicated accounting. A person could be listed in one unit, fight as part of a group from Military Unit 02511, receive medical treatment without contact with family, and disappear from the sight of both headquarters.

Kamenka before the war: eight officers dismissed

Problems at Military Unit 02511 were documented long before the invasion. In 2009, after a series of incidents, the Ministry of Defense and the Main Military Prosecutor's Office conducted a special inspection in Kamenka. Kommersant reported the death of a contract serviceman, escapes of conscripts, the hospitalization of a soldier with signs of violence, and a mass assault by drunk sergeants on fellow servicemen. One private had his jaw broken.

The result was a personnel decision rare for the Russian army: eight officers, from platoon commander to brigade commander, were dismissed from their positions. The Ministry of Defense acknowledged serious disciplinary violations and shortcomings in service organization that led to severe consequences. This was not an anonymous refusenik's account, but the conclusion of a joint state commission.

However, the dismissal of a group of commanders did not change the basic model. In subsequent years, the media again wrote about deaths, abuse, and complaints from Kamenka. In 2013, after another soldier's death, human rights activists reminded that the unit remained one of the most problematic garrisons in the Leningrad Oblast.

This pre-war history is important not as a mechanical explanation for all subsequent events. Hazing in the barracks is not equivalent to an order in battle. But it shows an institutional norm: violence was concealed until the number of incidents forced Moscow to intervene. Responsibility was personalized in a few dismissed officers, while the unit itself was preserved along with its regalia.

2014–2015: the first war without official participation

Military Unit 02511 appears in open-source materials about Russian intervention in Donbas as early as 2014. OSINT researchers recorded equipment and servicemen of the 138th Brigade in Rostov Oblast near the Ukrainian border. Later, former servicemen and investigators linked Kamenka's units to the battles for Debaltseve.

The Russian state at that time denied the presence of its regular army. Therefore, there is no open departmental record of 138th Brigade losses for Donbas. Families and fellow servicemen learned of deaths through closed channels, and at official ceremonies, the circumstances of death were vaguely formulated.

For the unit, this created useful experience in dual reporting. Internally, there were orders, deployments, equipment, and sanitary losses. Externally, there were volunteers, "vacationers," and the absence of the unit as a participant in the war. In 2022, denying the invasion itself was no longer possible, but the habit of not publishing losses and personnel movements persisted.

Kharkiv: "exercises" that ended in defeat

In the autumn of 2021, servicemen of the 138th Brigade were informed about prolonged field exercises. Contract soldier Vadim Martens called his mother a few days before the invasion and said he was in Ukraine. According to the family, he was not told the final objective in advance. A similar scenario was described by servicemen from various Russian formations: columns moved towards the border under the guise of exercises, and the combat order was announced already en route.

Units of Military Unit 02511 advanced east of Kharkiv. In March, Ukrainian sources announced the defeat of two battalion tactical groups of the 138th Brigade and a combined group of the 59th Tank Regiment. Photographs of destroyed and captured equipment were published. The exact ratio of losses for these units cannot be determined from the photos, so the claim of "two defeated BTGs" remains a statement from a party to the war.

Independent indicators confirm the severity of the defeat without needing to accept the maximum estimate. Funerals were held in Kamenka, local residents spoke of overcrowded hospitals, and the names of the deceased appeared in open sources. Martens' mother recalled her son's words: in his company, after the first months, only about seven people remained. This is the testimony of one serviceman, not a staff roster, but it explains why the unit recruited new people all summer.

In May, the remnants of the units were partially returned to the Leningrad Oblast. Contract soldiers tried to resign. According to Tatyana Martens, her son was threatened with criminal charges and prison. After the announcement of mobilization, contracts were automatically extended, and the possibility of legally leaving became even narrower. The rest in Kamenka turned out not to be the end of the war, but a pause before new manning.

Mala Rohan: equipment withdrawn, bodies left behind

The most vivid evidence of Military Unit 02511's first campaign was not in a cemetery in Russia, but in the ground near Mala Rohan. Spektr reporter Dmitry Durnev described in detail the hasty burial of people in Russian uniforms, two bodies in a water well, and another deceased person near a neighboring house. Medical records, equipment elements, and documents remained in the village.

An officer of the Ukrainian Civil-Military Cooperation service, who was involved in collecting the bodies, directly named the Krasnoselskaya 138th Brigade from Kamenka. He stated that chevrons and unit documents were found at the site, but most of the deceased could not be quickly identified: documents and dog tags were often removed. This is the assertion of a Ukrainian military officer, but it was based on specific work with bodies and material findings.

It is important not to try to attribute every deceased person around Kharkiv to Military Unit 02511. Various Russian units operated there. What is proven is different: brigade units were in Mala Rohan, bodies remained after their withdrawal, and the Russian unit did not organize their immediate return and identification.

This delay turned the deceased into a family problem. Until the body is identified, there is no notification, death record, or full set of payments. The difference between a loss on the battlefield and a legally recognized death could be months or years.

Two searches: hospital by tattoo and morgue by photo

The story of Vladimir Veselov shows that Military Unit 02511 lost not only the deceased. A contract soldier from another unit was seconded to the 138th Brigade and sent to Ukraine in April 2022. After a severe injury, he lay in a coma for three months. The family called the Ministry of Defense and other agencies until an employee of a Moscow hospital accidentally identified him by a tattoo.

All this time, commanders assured relatives that Veselov was alive, healthy, and on assignment. His real condition and whereabouts did not reach the family through the chain of command from the battlefield. The error continued not for a few hours of evacuation, but all summer.

Vadim Martens took a different route. After returning to the war, he died on March 15, 2023. His mother called the unit, hospitals, and the Red Cross for months. A fellow serviceman informed her of his death. Then she had to search for the body in morgues, obtain identification, and correct documents. The search took more than six months.

In 2025, a court act concerning another corporal from Military Unit 02511 appeared in an open database. The documents indicated that he disappeared after shelling and was presumed dead, but his body was not found. A relative had to appeal to a district court to declare him deceased and obtain the right to support measures. The court decision confirms a systemic problem without names or emotional retellings: the unit's own certificate did not complete the legal procedure for the family.

Sergey Maksimov: suspicion of an order to shell

The commander of the 138th Brigade during the offensive on Kharkiv was Colonel Sergey Maksimov. In May 2022, Ukrainian prosecutors announced that they suspected him of violating the laws and customs of war, coupled with intentional murder. The investigation alleged that on March 26, Maksimov ordered the use of the TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system against residential areas of Mala Rohan and Olkhivka.

As a result of the shelling, houses, a lyceum, and a dairy factory were damaged; a 13-year-old girl sustained fatal injuries. The prosecution stated that there were no military targets in the chosen area, and the commander understood the nature of the target. No public Russian investigation into this order appeared.

It is legally important to maintain the distinction: a notice of suspicion and materials from the Ukrainian investigation are not equivalent to a final conviction. There is no information in open sources that Maksimov was convicted by a court with his participation. However, his position, the brigade's presence in the area, and the fact of an official announcement of suspicion with a description of a specific incident have been established.

This did not hinder his career or the unit's structure. Maksimov continued to be listed as the commander of the formation, and the brigade was expanded into a division. The Russian award and organizational system did not demonstrate that the accusation of a child's death became grounds for even a public internal investigation.

Kupyansk: new rotation, old number

After Kharkiv, units of the 138th Brigade operated in Luhansk Oblast and in the Kupyansk direction. They participated in battles near Kreminna, Synkivka, and on the approaches to Oskil. In 2023, Sergey Shoigu named the 138th Brigade among the particularly distinguished formations. The open map, however, showed not a rapid breakthrough, but months of attacks for individual tree lines and villages.

By this stage, the unit's name already concealed a new composition. Personnel from 2021 had died, been wounded, captured, or attempted to resign. Their places were filled by mobilized personnel, new contract soldiers, and seconded individuals. Retaining the number created the appearance of a continuous combat unit, although several groups of people had changed internally.

For the command, such a model is convenient: the brigade remains on the map, receives tasks, and reports on actions. For families, it creates a gap in responsibility. The headquarters in Kamenka may not know which assault group a seconded individual ended up in; the field commander does not correspond with relatives; the hospital receives a soldier without reliable communication with the unit.

From brigade to division

On May 1, 2024, the 90th anniversary of the formation was celebrated on the parade ground in Kamenka. Local television reported that the unit was marking its anniversary "in a new capacity" – already as a division of the combined arms army of the Leningrad Military District. Thus, the 138th Brigade became the basis of the 69th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.

A division should have several motorized rifle regiments, a tank component, artillery, air defense, and expanded support. Such a transformation requires many more people than the peacetime authorized strength of a brigade. It does not prove the restoration of the previous composition: new regiments can be created by order, battalions transferred to them, and filled by recruiting new contract soldiers.

The organizational growth coincided with preparations for a new offensive on Kharkiv Oblast. As early as May 20, ISW recorded units of the 138th Brigade inside Vovchansk. Formally, the name was outdated, but at the front, the old battalions and headquarters were still referred to as the brigade. A few weeks later, public rhetoric about the new division clashed with videos of its small groups in urban ruins.

Vovchansk: the division was created before people were found

In July 2024, a serviceman from an assault unit of the 138th Brigade recorded a video after withdrawing from Vovchansk. According to him, out of 46 people in the group, 30 survived, many with severe injuries. It is impossible to verify every figure against an independent list, but the video itself shows the scale of attrition in one small unit.

The Ukrainian command stated that since the beginning of the offensive, Russia had lost most of the 138th Brigade in Vovchansk. This phrase cannot be translated into an exact number of dead: "loss" in military statistics can include killed, wounded, captured, and temporarily incapacitated, and the claimant is a party to the war. ISW confirmed the presence and regrouping of the brigade but did not confirm the full numerical balance.

The fighting continued. The Russian command introduced reinforcements and new regiments of the 69th Division. in December 2025, Andrey Belousov sent a congratulatory telegram to its command after Moscow's announcement of the capture of Vovchansk. Independent observers and the Ukrainian side disputed the completeness of control, but the official chronicle had already turned the protracted urban battle into a completed success.

By January 2026, the Critical Threats Project continued to record the 83rd and 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 69th Division in Kharkiv Oblast, including near Starytsia. That is, the transformation did not withdraw the unit from the war for restoration. It expanded the organizational shell and allowed the same headquarters to continue operations in the same direction.

What is proven and what remains an estimate

The unit number, deployment in Kamenka, subordination to the 6th Army, and the transformation of the brigade into the 69th Division are confirmed. The state inspection of 2009 and the dismissal of eight officers are confirmed. The participation of Military Unit 02511's subdivisions in battles near Kharkiv, Mala Rohan, in the Kupyansk direction, and in Vovchansk are confirmed.

Documentarily, there exists a court decision regarding a missing corporal, a public Ukrainian suspicion against Sergey Maksimov, and reports from Russian authorities about the new division. Journalistic materials include named relatives, medical details, and the sequence of searches for Vladimir Veselov and Vadim Martens.

There is no open, complete balance of brigade losses. The officer's words about more than 300 dead, the story of seven remaining in the company, the video of a group of 46 people, and the statement about the loss of "most of the brigade" relate to different periods and categories. They cannot be added together. They show the repeatability of heavy losses but do not provide a final figure.

The suspicion against Maksimov is not a conviction. The presence of bodies near Mala Rohan does not mean that all of them belonged specifically to Military Unit 02511. The correct conclusion is narrower and stronger: the unit was there, its traces and unevacuated deceased were found, and the Russian command did not publish transparent accounting or inspection results.

Conclusion: the unit grew faster than the list of losses

The history of Military Unit 02511 begins not with Vovchansk, nor even with Kharkiv. Even in peacetime, a state commission recognized serious violations, after which eight officers lost their positions. But the unit's number and its system survived this scandal. In 2014, the brigade gained experience in war without public accountability. In 2022, this experience scaled up.

Near Kharkiv, the formation lost personnel and equipment, then recruited new personnel. Some of the deceased were left in hasty burials, others were searched for in morgues. A wounded man was found by a tattoo after three months in a coma. The mother of a deceased soldier learned the truth from a fellow serviceman six months later. Another family needed a court to legally recognize a death.

After this, Military Unit 02511 was not reduced or withdrawn for public scrutiny. It was expanded into a division and sent back to Kharkiv Oblast. Vovchansk was not an exception, but a repetition: small groups disappeared in urban ruins, they were replenished, and the official outcome was measured not by people, but by the name of the captured city.

The unit's number proved more resilient than any of its compositions. It survived the dismissal of commanders, mass graves, hospitals without notifications, family searches, and several waves of replenishment. In Russian military accounting, this is called restoring combat capability and forming a new division. In human terms, it is a system that manages to create new regiments faster than it can name all those who did not return from the old ones.