The 76th Airborne Division has two biographies. The first is written on award ribbons: the oldest active formation of Russian paratroopers, Pskov, 'Guards,' Chernigov, Orders of the Red Banner, Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Alexander Nevsky. The second is compiled from fresh graves, surveillance camera footage, phone connections, documents from abandoned headquarters, and confessions from people who worked inside Military Unit No. 07264.

In 2014, the deaths of Pskov paratroopers in Donbas were declared a state secret. In 2022, the unit numbers of the 76th Division were found in Bucha. By the end of 2024, journalists confirmed at least 607 deceased servicemen from the formation. In July 2026, a former staff sergeant revealed that personnel numbers for Moscow were inflated, staff positions were sold, and people were threatened with deployment to assault units for violating internal order.

This investigation does not attribute everything that happened in every area of its presence to the division. We distinguish between what is established by documents, the conclusions of journalistic investigations, official investigative suspicions, and the testimony of a single source. But even with these caveats, the picture remains coherent: an elite formation turned out to be a system that concealed some losses, replenished others, and continued to receive awards.

What is part of Military Unit No. 07264

The provisional number for the command of the 76th Guards Airborne Assault Division is Military Unit No. 07264. Its headquarters is in Pskov. Key maneuver units include the 104th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment, Military Unit No. 32515 in Cherekha; the 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment, Military Unit No. 74268 in Pskov; the re-established 237th Regiment; the 1140th Artillery Regiment, as well as tank, reconnaissance, engineer, signal, and support battalions.

The division was the first in the Russian army to be declared fully contract-based in 2004. This status was part of its brand: professional rapid-response paratroopers who could be deployed to the most dangerous sectors. In practice, the formation was used for decades not only for airborne operations but also as assault infantry – in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, Donbas, and the full-scale war.

After the invasion began, the structure expanded. In 2025, according to Sergeant Andrei Chernenko, who worked with the system, the division's personnel database contained approximately 20,000 entries. This does not mean 20,000 simultaneously combat-ready paratroopers: the database included reserves, wounded, staff, support, missing personnel, those who had gone AWOL, and other categories. The discrepancy between the listed and actual combat strength became one of the main internal problems.

2014: An award alongside secret burials

In August 2014, Ukrainian forces captured two BMD-2s with documents from the 76th Division in Luhansk Oblast. In those same days, fresh graves of servicemen Leonid Kichatkin and Alexander Osipov appeared near Pskov. Company commander Anton Korolenko was buried in Voronezh Oblast. Relatives and military units avoided explanations, and official structures denied the formation's involvement in the war.

Pskovskaya Guberniya published an investigation and recordings of conversations that indicated heavy losses for a combined unit. Deputy and editor of the publication Lev Shlosberg demanded an investigation into the deaths of twelve paratroopers. The military prosecutor's office replied that the circumstances had been established, but operations outside permanent deployment locations and events that occurred there were state secrets.

On August 18, 2014, in the midst of these events, Vladimir Putin awarded the division the Order of Suvorov for 'successful completion of combat missions.' The decree did not specify where these missions were carried out. This created a formula that would later become familiar: the feat is recognized by an award, the location and cost of the feat are hidden, and families must agree to silence.

The assertion of almost an entire company's death in 2014 was based on conversation recordings and source reports, not on a published official list. Therefore, we do not present it as an established figure. What is established is different: specific servicemen died during the days of fighting, the division's equipment ended up in Ukraine, the place of death of one of the paratroopers was later directly indicated on a memorial plaque, and the state classified the circumstances.

Hostomel and the failed route to Kyiv

On February 24, 2022, the Russian command attempted to capture Hostomel airfield with a helicopter assault and turn it into an air bridge for an offensive on Kyiv. Various Airborne Forces and special forces units participated in the operation; the 76th Division was part of the group advancing through Hostomel, Bucha, and Irpin.

The initial plan assumed a rapid paralysis of Ukrainian command. Instead, the airfield became a zone of heavy fighting, the runway's suitability for mass landings was thwarted, and columns on the approaches to Kyiv got stuck. It is important not to distort history: the losses of the first helicopter assault cannot be automatically attributed solely to the 76th Division – other units were also operating there. The responsibility of the Pskov formation is clearer at the next stage, when its regiments entrenched themselves in Bucha.

After the failure of the rapid capture of the capital, the paratroopers performed the tasks of regular occupation and assault infantry. It was during this period that Russian units set up checkpoints, occupied residential buildings, conducted searches, and carried out so-called 'clearances.' The documents they left behind later allowed for a shift from the general designation 'Russian troops' to specific regiments.

Bucha: from a number on a box to a specific platoon

Reuters spent three weeks working in Bucha, interviewing over 90 residents, examining photos, videos, and documents. In one house, a letter was found addressed to serviceman Alexander Logvinenko from Pskov Oblast. The signature 'Wolf_68' remained on the wall, which journalists linked to a serviceman of the 234th Regiment. On Vodoprovodna Street, a document was discovered regarding the inspection of mortars by officers of Military Unit No. 74268 – the number of the same 234th Regiment. On Vokzalna Street, a list of call signs for the 104th Regiment was found.

Traces of presence alone do not yet prove the involvement of every serviceman in a crime. But investigations went further. Associated Press and FRONTLINE studied hours of camera recordings and intercepted conversations, reconstructing the work of the Russian headquarters at Yablunska, 144. The New York Times, using video and phone data, linked the killings on Yablunska Street to paratroopers of the 234th Regiment and pointed to regimental commander Artyom Gorodilov.

In 2025, the investigation into a separate incident on Ivan Franko Street named a specific group: a platoon of the 234th Regiment commanded by Yuri Kim. According to Global Rights Compliance and the Ukrainian investigation, Kim is suspected of responsibility for 17 murders and four cases of cruel treatment. The investigation alleges that he gave orders to search for and kill civilians believed to be connected with Ukrainian forces, and then to burn the bodies. This is a procedural suspicion, not a final verdict.

This clarification is also important for earlier materials: the killings on Ivan Franko Street were initially often linked to Chechen units or the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade. Later ballistics, documents, and OSINT led investigators to the 234th Regiment of the 76th Division. Thus, the general formula 'Bucha atrocities' turned into a verifiable chain – division, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, and specific names.

Russia denies responsibility and calls Bucha a staged event. However, the presence of units is confirmed not only by Ukrainian testimony: it is documented by found Russian documents, independent journalistic investigations, surveillance cameras, phone connections, and obituaries of servicemen who died directly in the city.

Commanders: Chubarykin, Shishov, and Gorodilov

At the start of the full-scale invasion, the division was commanded by Major General Sergei Chubarykin. Ukrainian authorities link him to waging aggressive war and are investigating command responsibility for the actions of his subordinates in Kyiv Oblast. There is no public court decision establishing his personal guilt for specific murders.

In April 2022, Denis Shishov, who previously commanded the 11th Airborne Assault Brigade, took over the division. He was severely wounded near Mykolaiv and received the title Hero of Russia. In 2024–2025, Abdulaziz Shikhabirov was named commander in open sources, then Shishov returned to lead the formation again. Due to the classified nature of personnel orders, transition dates vary in public sources.

Artyom Gorodilov commanded the 234th Regiment during the Bucha period and later received the rank of colonel. In July 2024, he was arrested in Russia on charges of large-scale fraud. The Russian case did not concern Bucha. This episode is indicative in another way: an officer whom international investigations linked to the unit on Yablunska Street was prosecuted by the Russian system not for actions in Ukraine, but for alleged embezzlement.

Kherson and Robotyne: elites used as a fire brigade

After withdrawing from Kyiv Oblast, division units were redeployed to the east and south. They operated near Izium and Popasna, then held the right bank of Kherson Oblast. In autumn 2022, Ukrainian intelligence stated that the 237th Regiment had effectively ceased to exist due to killed and wounded personnel. Legally, the regiment did not disappear: its remnants and new recruits continued service, so the phrase 'ceased to exist' should be understood as an assessment of loss of combat capability, not an official disbandment.

In November, the division, along with the rest of the Russian grouping, withdrew from the right bank of the Dnipro. In August 2023, it was redeployed to Robotyne, where Ukrainian forces had broken through the first line of defense. Russian pro-war sources presented this maneuver as the arrival of a reliable reserve. Essentially, the elite formation was again used to resolve a crisis that had arisen under another command.

In late 2023, a video emerged showing three Ukrainian servicemen captured near Robotyne and later executed. The Ukrainian prosecutor's office launched an investigation and stated the probable involvement of servicemen from the 76th Division. At the time of writing, there is no open court decision or full named identification of the perpetrators, so this episode remains an investigated suspicion.

607 confirmed dead – and this is the lower bound

By January 2025, Mediazona and BBC Russian Service had found at least 607 deceased servicemen of the 76th Division in open sources. The list only included cases where an obituary, a message from relatives, a cemetery record, or another public source allowed confirmation of both death and connection to the formation.

This figure cannot be taken as a complete total. The Russian Ministry of Defense does not publish losses by unit. Obituaries often do not name the unit, some deaths do not become public, and transferred or attached servicemen may be accounted for differently. The named list provides a lower bound: there were no fewer deaths, but how many more – open data does not allow to establish.

Officer losses are particularly noticeable. By the end of 2024, journalists had identified at least twelve deceased officers of the division with the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. On the night of December 30–31, a strike on a deployment location in Lgov killed the division's chief of communications, Lieutenant Colonel Valery Tereshchenko, commander of the 656th Engineer Battalion Pavel Maletsky, chief of the NBC protection service Alexey Seliverstov, and deputy chief of staff Major Ali Tsurov. One obituary mentioned eight deceased staff officers and 22 wounded; journalists confirmed four by name.

The strike on the headquarters is important not only for the number. A division that should have advanced communications, intelligence, and command post protection lost several senior specialists in one location. Later testimony from a staff sergeant about a formal attitude towards secrecy and non-functional electronic warfare added an internal explanation to the externally observed vulnerability.

The price of a staff position – half a million

On July 20, 2026, The Insider published the account of Andrei Chernenko, a junior sergeant of the reserve battalion of the 76th Division, who worked in the mobilization and manning department of Military Unit No. 07264 headquarters, and then left Russia. The editorial office provided photographs, system names, positions, and details of document flow. However, this is still the testimony of one person, not a completed judicial verification of every episode named.

Chernenko claims that after signing his contract, he paid 500,000 rubles for the opportunity to remain at headquarters. According to him, such a scheme was applied not only to him, and part of the money might have gone to employees of the manning department. Two young men who traveled with him and were initially considered for technical specialties were sent to the 104th Regiment and then into assault – both died.

At training grounds, according to his account, attempts were made to prepare people of different ages and health conditions in two weeks, while simultaneously using them for heavy labor. At headquarters, the threat of being sent 'to assault units' was used as disciplinary punishment. An employee of the 104th Regiment was allegedly sent to an assault unit after one day of absence – he had gone to his mother's grave.

If the testimony is true, a parallel market for safety emerged within the 'professional' division. A person with money could buy a position further from the front line. A person without connections or who violated internal rules risked becoming an assault soldier regardless of their initial specialty. This is not just corruption: a bribe changed the probability of survival.

Two rosters: one for the commander, another for Moscow

Chernenko worked with daily orders and combat strength data. He described two reporting variants: one for the division commander, the other for sending to Moscow. According to his observations, manning data for higher command was inflated by 10–20 percent.

The mechanism has a direct military consequence. If a regiment is better manned on paper than in reality, higher command may assign it a task that the actual composition cannot perform. The missing personnel are then compensated by accelerated recruitment, transfers, and new contract soldiers. The report looks stable until real units again face losses.

The sergeant also reported that during periods of active fighting, the division lost up to 200 people per week killed and missing in action, and in calmer periods – up to 100. Upon his departure, approximately four thousand missing personnel were allegedly listed. These numbers cannot be compared with the 607 individually confirmed dead as identical categories: a 'missing person' could be a prisoner, in a hospital, AWOL, in another unit, or later found alive. Furthermore, these are data from the words of one employee.

Separately, Chernenko recounted the content of a document seen by a colleague: the cumulative irrecoverable losses of the Airborne Forces from the start of the war until 2025 allegedly amounted to 19,500 personnel. This referred to all Airborne Forces, not just the 76th Division. The document itself has not been published, so the figure remains second-hand testimony and should not be used as an established official total.

499 AWOL and pressure on mobilized personnel

According to Chernenko, the division's personnel system contained approximately 499 servicemen with AWOL status. Simultaneously, there was a top-down demand to compel mobilized personnel to sign contracts. Those who refused could be sent to assault units. Initially, the target was allegedly 1,500–2,000 people, then the plan was reduced to 200.

AWOL status does not explain the motive of every individual. Someone might have fled after being wounded, a conflict, refusing to return to the front line, due to payment issues, or for personal reasons. But hundreds of entries within a single division contradict the image of a stable, voluntary collective. Especially if, simultaneously, a position in the rear headquarters, according to the sergeant's testimony, was sold for money.

The system responded not by addressing the causes, but by searching for and coercing. The reserve battalion included wounded personnel, instructors, drivers, and those unofficially tasked with finding those who had gone AWOL. Thus, part of the division's resources went into returning its own servicemen to duty.

Secrecy with password QWE123

At headquarters, there were 'red' and 'blue' computers and storage devices with different levels of access. According to Chernenko, data transfer between circuits was practically carried out using special USB drives, which were sometimes lost. Passwords for computers and archives were often based on simple templates – QWE123, QASD, unit number plus department number.

He claims that ordinary mobile communication was used even when secure channels were available, and an employee was able to launch a drone over headquarters without effective electronic warfare countermeasures. These details cannot be verified by publishing active technical parameters, but they describe an organizational culture: requirements exist on paper and are mainly observed before an inspection.

The very fact of an employee with access to personnel data fleeing shows the limits of this system. Chernenko claims he was able to prepare his departure, delete digital traces, and leave Russia. After his service, he joined a project assisting refuseniks and deserters.

What is proven – and what remains testimony

The division's number and structure are documented; the presence of the 104th and 234th Regiments in Bucha; documents and call signs found there; the deaths of division officers in Bucha and Lgov; at least 607 individually identified deaths by the end of 2024; the awarding of the Order of Suvorov to the division in August 2014; and sanction decisions related to crimes in Bucha.

Journalistic investigations with video, phone data, and testimonies link the 234th Regiment to the killings on Yablunska Street. The Ukrainian investigation and Global Rights Compliance suspect Yuri Kim's platoon of killing 17 civilians on Ivan Franko Street. This is a serious body of evidence, but personal criminal responsibility is ultimately established by a court.

Chernenko's account is corroborated by his service, photographs, and knowledge of internal procedures, however, claims of bribes, two versions of personnel numbers, four thousand missing, and the weekly pace of losses primarily come from him. The figure of 19,500 refers to all Airborne Forces and is recounted from the words of a colleague who allegedly saw the document. We present this data as testimony from headquarters, not as official statistics.

Statements about the destruction of an entire regiment or the complete defeat of a division also require caution. A military unit can lose combat capability, receive new personnel, and continue to exist under the same number. This is why awards and official names say little about how many pre-war servicemen remained within.

Conclusion: an elite division with two balance sheets

The 76th Division retains everything necessary for its official legend: an old banner, a long name, orders, parades, and the status of one of the main Airborne Forces formations. Its regiments are redeployed to crisis areas, and its commanders are awarded. Administratively, the unit has not only survived but also expanded.

The second biography looks different. It includes the secret burials of 2014, documents from Bucha, specific suspects in murders, 607 confirmed dead, staff officers gathered in one vulnerable location, hundreds of AWOL cases, and young contract soldiers whose specialty is determined not by training but by the current needs of an assault unit.

The main problem of Military Unit No. 07264 is not a single failure or a single commander. It is the system's ability to transform losses into reports. For Moscow, there is one troop strength; for the commander, another; for relatives, search announcements; for investigators, camera recordings and phone connections. Until these four versions are reconciled into one honest balance, the word 'elite' describes only the division's brand, but not how it fights and how many people it expends to maintain that brand.