On March 23, 2026, a Soyuz-2.1b rocket launched from a Russian military cosmodrome. Under its fairing were sixteen 'Buro 1440' spacecraft — the first batch of the future low-Earth orbit communication system 'Rassvet'. For the company, this marked a fundamental transition. Previously, it had sent only six experimental satellites into orbit. Now, the deployment of a network that Russian officials call an answer to Starlink, and for which the state is prepared to allocate over one hundred billion rubles, was beginning.

Two and a half months later, one spacecraft from the March batch deorbited and burned up in the atmosphere. The others ascended significantly slower than external observers expected: by July, none had reached the 800-kilometer altitude stated on the company's website. 'Buro 1440' responded that the fifteen satellites had passed key system checks, were performing maneuvers, and operating normally. On July 19, a second batch launch took place. The company did not disclose the number of spacecraft, but the NORAD catalog and industry observers identified another sixteen.

This sequence proves neither the failure nor the success of 'Rassvet'. The loss of a single satellite for a new constellation is not a catastrophe, and a prolonged ascent using low thrust can be a normal part of testing. However, the story of the first production batch reveals the project's main contradiction. 'Buro 1440' has moved beyond the presentation stage, yet it is still very far from the promised mass service. Now, success is determined not by an isolated communication session, but by the ability to produce, launch, and replace hundreds of spacecraft for years.

A Company That Grew Faster Than Its Own Program

The project emerged in 2020 as the 'MegaFon 1440' laboratory. The name referenced the number of minutes in a day: the future network was intended to provide continuous communication. The initial plan appeared relatively modest — 'MegaFon' intended to invest about 6 billion rubles in the development of a low-Earth orbit system. In late 2021, VTB invested another 2 billion and acquired 15 percent of the company.

Following the division of USM assets, the project transferred to 'IKS Holding' and was renamed 'Buro 1440'. The ownership structure became less transparent. In 2023, 'Kommersant' reported that current ownership data in SPARK was hidden; the holding confirmed control over the asset but did not disclose the full configuration. For a typical private startup, this would be a corporate detail. For a recipient of large-scale state support, opacity is more significant: it complicates answering the question of who precisely bears the commercial risk and from what resources the declared private share of the project should be financed.

At the same time, the production footprint itself grew significantly. As of August 2026, the company claims approximately 3,500 employees, 80 percent of whom are engineers, designers, software developers, and operations specialists. 'Buro 1440' develops not only satellites but also subscriber terminals, laser inter-satellite communication, gateway stations, and management software. This set of competencies distinguishes the project from a mere intermediary that purchases a ready-made platform and affixes its own logo.

From Six Prototypes to the First Production Batch

The first three experimental 'Rassvet-1' spacecraft launched on June 27, 2023. The company reported video communication between the Moscow control center and a subscriber on Mount Fisht, as well as testing of engines and the ground segment. On May 17, 2024, three more satellites from the 'Rassvet-2' mission were launched into orbit. On these, their own laser terminals were tested: according to the company, over 200 gigabytes were transmitted between the spacecraft at a speed of 10 Gbit/s. In June, a session between a satellite and a terminal using 5G NTN technology took place.

These are real engineering results, but their significance is limited by the experimental nature. Three spacecraft can confirm the operation of a radio link, an inter-satellite channel, or a control system. They cannot demonstrate continuous coverage of a large area, automatic switching of thousands of subscribers between satellites, the stability of a mass service, or its cost-effectiveness. Laboratory success answers the question 'can the technology work'. A commercial network must answer another: 'can it work constantly, for a large number of clients, and at an acceptable price'.

The March 2026 launch was supposed to initiate this transition. Sixteen spacecraft were placed into an approximately 300-kilometer parking orbit, after which they began their independent ascent. One satellite failed to maintain orbit and burned up in early June. The company confirmed that fifteen remained in orbit but emphasized that the service launch timelines and stated communication quality would not change. A single failure in itself says little about the reliability of a future constellation — redundancy is a normal part of low-Earth orbit network architecture. Far more important are the condition of the remaining spacecraft and the pace of subsequent launches.

The Dispute Around 800 Kilometers

On the official 'Buro 1440' website, the system is stated to operate at an altitude of 800 kilometers, with speeds up to 1 Gbit/s and latency up to 70 milliseconds. However, open orbital data in July 2026 showed a different picture. According to ComNews analysis based on NORAD and tracking services, twelve spacecraft from the March batch were at altitudes of approximately 502–523 kilometers, while three others lagged significantly — in the 361–386 kilometer range. Two satellites that reached 533–540 kilometers then descended to approximately 514 kilometers.

From these observations, a hypothesis emerged that the operator might have changed the operational configuration and halted the main group around 500–520 kilometers. Such a decision has both advantages and costs. At a lower altitude, latency is reduced, and radio link power efficiency improves, but the coverage area of a single spacecraft becomes smaller. For continuous service, this would require more satellites, more frequent switching of subscriber terminals, and a different calculation of the constellation's resources.

'Buro 1440' has not publicly confirmed a transition to a new altitude. Specialists interviewed by ComNews warned that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions: electro-reactive engines produce low thrust, so orbital raising can take months; an altitude of around 515 kilometers could be an intermediate platform for testing and phasing. This is an important caveat. Orbital data allows for tracking trajectories but does not reveal the engineers' intent. Until an operator statement, it is correct to speak of a discrepancy between the publicly stated goal and the observed position of the spacecraft, rather than a proven abandonment of the architecture.

The second July batch therefore became not just another launch, but a test of the hypothesis. If the new spacecraft form the same echelon around 515 kilometers, the assumption of a configuration change will be strengthened. If they continue their ascent to 800 kilometers, the March group might have been performing a separate test program. As of the material's preparation date, a full answer is not yet available.

Plans That Move With Deadlines

As early as 2024, an explanatory note to amendments to the federal budget described a constellation of 288 spacecraft and 66 satellites that were supposed to be created and launched by 2025. The company reported plans to conduct 10–12 launches annually from 2025, with approximately fifteen spacecraft per rocket, and to begin commercial operation in 2027. In fact, the first batch of sixteen production satellites launched only in March 2026, and the second in July.

Later documents provide a different benchmark. National project materials mention 292 spacecraft by 2030, including reserves, and a Roscosmos representative cited 2027–2028 as the timeframe for corporate service availability in Russia. Roscosmos separately presented a configuration of approximately 300 satellites. These figures pertain to different editions and metrics, so they cannot be mechanically declared a contradiction. But together, they show that the deployment horizon has lengthened, and the initial schedule of launching dozens of spacecraft per year has not been met.

Even if both 2026 batch launches are counted as sixteen satellites each, by August the company had launched 32 spacecraft for the target constellation, one of which was lost, plus six earlier experimental ones. To approach 292 spacecraft by the end of 2030, over 250 more need to be launched — without accounting for new failures and planned replacements. This is not an unattainable arithmetic: on average, it involves several tens of satellites per year. But it requires a stable series of launches, whereas almost four months passed between the first two batches, and the early plan envisioned 10–12 rockets per year.

445 Billion and the Question of Private Risk

According to the federal project passport, published by industry media in 2025, the creation of the constellation was estimated at approximately 445 billion rubles. 'Buro 1440' was expected to contribute 329 billion of its own funds, while state support would amount to about 116 billion — through preferential loans, launch subsidies, and deployment financing. In later publications, the sum of direct support until 2030 was stated as 102.8 billion rubles. The difference is due to project revisions and the composition of instruments, so it is more accurate to speak not of a single final estimate, but of a state commitment on the scale of over one hundred billion.

As early as 2024, budget amendments allocated 9.35 billion rubles for purchasing materials and components for 66 spacecraft. Later, tens of billions in budget appropriations were mentioned for subsequent years. The state is not only paying for the social effect of communication in remote regions; it is helping a private entity navigate the most expensive stage — serial production and constellation deployment.

At this point, a key economic question arises. The declared 329 billion rubles are supposed to come from the company itself, but there is no public profitability model. The mass price of the terminal, average revenue per subscriber, network maintenance costs, and the share of orders from state-owned companies have not been disclosed. The early 'Buro 1440' grew from a telecom project with a budget of several billion into an infrastructure program worth almost half a trillion. The more the project depends on the budget and large state clients, the less accurate the definition 'private space company' becomes.

Why Comparing to Starlink is Both Useful and Deceptive

Starlink provided Russian officials with a clear political formula: the country needs its own low-Earth orbit internet that cannot be shut down by a foreign provider. But the comparison hides the difference in stages. As early as February 2025, Starlink reported over 6,750 satellites in orbit and millions of active clients. SpaceX simultaneously produces spacecraft, operates its own reusable rocket, regularly performs launches, and sells mass-market terminals. 'Buro 1440', by August 2026, is only testing the first tens of satellites of its target constellation and depends on the external schedule of 'Soyuz' rockets.

Therefore, the speed of a single channel — up to 1 Gbit/s as stated by the company — says almost nothing about the equality of the systems. A user buys not a single test record, but availability at the desired location, stability during satellite switching, a terminal, technical support, and a predictable tariff. These parameters only emerge after the construction of orbital, ground, and commercial infrastructure. For now, 'Rassvet' is a Russian analogue of Starlink in architectural idea, but not in scale and service maturity.

There is also a fundamental difference in launches. Vertical integration allows SpaceX to modify satellites and rockets as parts of a single production system. 'Buro 1440' develops the space and ground segments, but the launch vehicle is external to the company. Any delay in the rocket, upper stage, or cosmodrome becomes a delay for the constellation. For a network where spacecraft need constant replenishment, this is not a one-time logistical problem, but part of the overall project's economics.

A Civilian Network with Inevitable Dual-Use Capabilities

Officially, 'Buro 1440' offers communication for mining companies, geological exploration, operators, aviation, railways, ships, automobiles, education, healthcare, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS), and government agencies. Terminals are designed, among other things, for mobile objects. Agreements and contracts have already been concluded with Russian telecom operators, Russian Railways (RZhD), aviation, and industrial structures. For a vast territory with remote settlements and extensive infrastructure, such a market exists independently of war.

However, low-Earth orbit communication is inherently dual-use. Mobile headquarters, border services, the navy, and other government users require the same properties as a train or a geological expedition: independence from local towers, wide coverage, and transmission of large volumes of data. The experience of Starlink and the separate government service Starshield shows how close commercial and secure government architectures are.

From this, however, it does not follow that every 'Rassvet' satellite is designed to control a specific type of Russian weapon. There is no technical documentation in open sources that would confirm the system's integration with 'Geran' drones, cruise missiles, or specific command posts. Launches from the military Plesetsk Cosmodrome and state interest indicate strategic importance, but do not prove a specific combat contour. The initial version of the article substituted such a possibility for an established fact — and that is precisely why its conclusion was unreliable.

Not a Failure, But an Unfinished Exam

The simplest criticism of 'Buro 1440' revolves around a single burned-up spacecraft. It is also the weakest. New satellite platforms undergo flight testing, and large constellations are designed with individual failures in mind. If the remaining fifteen satellites from the March batch confirm operability, the loss of one will be an engineering incident, not a death sentence for the program.

Stronger criticism lies elsewhere. In 2024, state documents projected 66 spacecraft by 2025 and a double-digit number of launches annually. By August 2026, two batch launches had occurred. The observed orbit of the first batch does not match the publicly stated 800 kilometers, and the operator has not explained whether this is a temporary scheme or a new architecture. The estimated budget has approached 445 billion rubles, but there is still no public economic model for the service. It is these discrepancies that require explanation — not because the project is fictitious, but because it has become too large and too strategically important for evaluation based on promotional demonstrations.

'Buro 1440' has already proven that Russian private-state cooperation is capable of assembling a team, creating its own spacecraft and terminals, testing laser communication, and moving to batch launches within a few years. This is more than a presentation. But the Russian Starlink does not begin with the sixteenth or thirty-second satellite. It begins when the spacecraft form a continuous network, terminals go into mass production, clients receive service, and launches transform from an event into a routine.

Therefore, the main indicator for 'Rassvet' in the coming years is not a beautiful shot of satellites separating or the maximum speed of a test connection. It is the schedule: how many spacecraft have been produced, how many have reached their operational orbit, how many have been re-launched to replace those lost, and when the first paid, stable service emerged. So far, this schedule lags behind early promises. Whether 'Buro 1440' can close the gap will become clear not from a new press release, but from the regularity of subsequent launches and the status of the already deployed constellation.