A Russian electronic warfare station begins to operate — and at that very moment, it becomes part of the target map. While its transmitters interfere with navigation and control channels, enemy electronic intelligence assets search for the source of emission. If the station remains in place for too long, a drone or other strike asset may be directed towards it. If it is switched off or moved further away, the protected area once again becomes vulnerable. This dilemma encapsulates the entire history of Russian EW after four years of full-scale war.

Before February 2022, Russian systems were described as the foundation of an almost impenetrable suppression zone. After the initial failures of the invasion, an opposing myth emerged: that cumbersome 'Zhitel', 'Borisoglebsk', and 'Krasukha' systems proved useless against cheap civilian drones. Both portrayals distort reality. Russia has not lost its electronic warfare capabilities. On the contrary, it has learned to deploy them more densely and closer to its troops. However, the war itself evolved faster than a system designed for centralized control.

Today, EW does not form a single dome. It is an evolving network of large stations, mobile groups, trench devices, vehicle-mounted jammers, and electronic intelligence assets. It can sharply reduce the effectiveness of specific weapons in a particular area, but it cannot equally cover all frequencies, all altitudes, and all types of communication. The main outcome of recent years is not the 'collapse' of Russian systems, but their loss of status as a universal solution.

A Strong System Built for a Different War

Russia began a large-scale modernization of its EW capabilities after the 2008 military reform. A study by the International Centre for Defence and Security, published back in 2018, described the consistent updating of equipment, structure, training, and automated control. The task was broader than simply jamming radio stations: to detect emissions, disrupt communication and navigation, cover its own units, and assist the reconnaissance-fire contour in finding targets.

This system was created as an asymmetric response against an adversary dependent on satellite navigation, secure communications, radars, and network-centric control. In such a model, a specialized brigade or a large complex identifies a limited set of priority signals and creates an effect at the right time and in the right direction. Russia possessed trained specialists, a range of serial production stations, and combat experience from Donbas and Syria — advantages that most armies lacked.

However, the 2022 war presented a different challenge. The electromagnetic spectrum became saturated with thousands of small devices, commercial radio stations, satellite terminals, and constantly changing data transmission channels. Instead of a few critical networks, a multitude of cheap targets emerged. These could be lost, replaced, and reconfigured faster than heavy military equipment. Russian EW entered the conflict strong but was forced to adapt to a war of mass production.

From Failure to a Second Wind

In the initial months of the invasion, the presence of modern systems did not translate into a continuous advantage. Russian columns stretched out, staff coordination was disrupted, and enemy suppression conflicted with the communication needs of their own units. A powerful transmitter does not distinguish intent: if frequencies are not reconnoitered and operations are not coordinated, interference affects not only enemy channels. Even advanced equipment offers little help to a unit that does not understand when to activate it or how to operate within the zone it creates.

Subsequently, Russian forces adapted. By spring 2023, RUSI estimated the density of large systems at approximately one per ten kilometers of front. The same report cited an estimate of Ukrainian losses of about 10,000 UAVs per month. This figure is often repeated as precise EW victory statistics, although the authors relied on interviews with Ukrainian military personnel, and overall losses predominantly included numerous cheap devices, with causes not always separable. However, the sheer scale indicates something important: by this point, Russian suppression could no longer be considered ineffective.

EW influenced more than just drones. A RUSI study from 2025 noted a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of Excalibur guided artillery shells as Russian countermeasures adapted. Specific figures cannot be applied to all precision-guided munitions: different projectiles use different guidance and protection methods. Nevertheless, this episode demonstrates a strong aspect of the Russian model — the ability to concentrate observation and jamming against a known threat, study it, and gradually reduce its effect.

Mass FPV Broke the Concept of Constant Protection

The problem arose not because Russian stations suddenly stopped emitting. The tempo of confrontation changed. Manufacturers and units began altering frequency ranges, antennas, software settings, and image transmission methods. A jammer that worked successfully yesterday might not detect a new configuration today. After its detection, equipment needed to be updated or a different module delivered. During this time, the adversary would change their solution again.

The FPV drone proved to be a particularly inconvenient target. It is cheap compared to the equipment it attacks, flies low, appears briefly, and can be controlled on one of many available channels. To cover a vehicle or position, it's not enough to simply place a box with antennas nearby. One needs to know in advance what to look for, avoid interfering with friendly drones, ensure power supply, correctly position antennas, and constantly update settings. EW transformed from a rare specialized function into a daily service for almost every unit.

RUSI noted in its report on the third year of the war that navigation jamming became ubiquitous, and jammers appeared on most vehicles entering the combat zone. Simultaneously, researchers observed an inverse effect: coordination difficulties and interference with friendly channels made the operation of friendly UAVs intermittent. The denser the protection, the harder it became to maintain secure communication windows for friendly operators. The electronic shield began to hinder the very weapons without which the Russian army itself could no longer fight.

The Cost of Emission

Large complexes remain useful because they can see and affect targets further than small trench devices. However, their power and specialization create vulnerability. An active station leaves an electromagnetic signature; antennas and auxiliary vehicles need to be deployed; and the crew requires time for operation and movement. An adversary combining electronic intelligence, aerial surveillance, and long-range strike capabilities can turn the operation of a complex into a target detection chain.

Visually confirmed losses do not allow for calculating the overall effectiveness of Russian EW, but they refute the notion of its invulnerability. Oryx includes destroyed, damaged, and captured vehicles of various types in its registry only when photographic or video evidence is available. Defense Express, relying on this data and two later episodes, estimated in March 2026 the losses of the R-330Zh 'Zhitel' system at a minimum of 25 destroyed or damaged complexes. This is not an official total or a complete balance: a single entry may refer to an individual component, the extent of damage from video is not always clear, and unpublicized cases are not included in the list.

The main point here is not the cost of a single station or the impressive sum of total losses. What matters is the operational exchange. Each destroyed specialized complex is harder to replace than a mass-produced FPV. But each loss does not mean that an entire section of the front remains without suppression: functions are partially covered by other means, and the Russian army is increasingly distributing them among small platforms. Therefore, hunting large stations accelerates the transition to more dispersed EW, rather than destroying the ability to create interference itself.

Fiber Optics Bypassed EW — and Confirmed Its Importance

The most notable challenge came not from a new frequency band, but entirely from beyond the radio spectrum. A drone with a fiber-optic cable maintains a physical connection with the operator and does not require a radio control channel. Conventional jamming cannot sever a line that does not exist in the airwaves. In 2024, Russia was one of the first to scale up such FPVs, particularly in the Kursk direction, and the technology then spread to other sectors and was quickly adopted by Ukraine.

Fiber optics is often cited as proof of EW's demise. In reality, the conclusion is the opposite. The transition to a heavier, more expensive, and complex cable scheme was necessary precisely because radio suppression had become too widespread. The platform gained stable video and control but paid for it with the weight of the spool, limited maneuverability, and the risk of cable breakage or snagging. This is not a replacement for all radio-controlled devices, but a distinct tool for areas where the airwaves are particularly hostile.

By summer 2026, the scale of the change was already visible beyond the tactical line. Reuters, in conjunction with the Centre for Information Resilience, confirmed a series of strikes by Russian fiber-optic FPVs on Ukrainian substations in Sumy Oblast. The targets were located up to 26 kilometers from the front line, and the drones bypassed electronic protection due to wired control. This episode demonstrated that an area previously considered protected by jamming is no longer automatically safe.

Why You Can't Turn Everything Off

EW has a fundamental limitation that cannot be solved by increasing power. The Russian army simultaneously wants to suppress Ukrainian drones and use its own drones, communications, and navigation in the same territory. The wider the jamming band and the longer it is active, the higher the probability of disrupting its own reconnaissance-strike contour. RUSI refers to this as a problem of coordination and electronic 'friendly fire'.

In practice, a commander has to choose: close a specific sector, leave a window for their own UAV, change the route, or accept increased risk. Such work requires a comprehensive picture of the spectrum, an up-to-date signal library, and communication between EW crews, drone operators, and fire assets. The centralized Russian system is good at concentrating rare capabilities but struggles more when decisions need to be updated daily at the level of small units.

Hence the seemingly contradictory evidence. In one sector, operators report almost insurmountable interference, while in an adjacent one, drones reach their targets. In one episode, a precision-guided munition loses accuracy, while in another, the station meant to interfere with it is hit by a drone. These are not mutually exclusive facts. Electronic warfare is always localized, depends on configuration, and exists only until the adversary's system changes again.

Large Complexes and Trench Boxes

Russian EW has gradually divided into two levels. Large systems continue to perform reconnaissance, navigation, and communication suppression tasks at operational depth. Below this, a market for small devices emerged to protect trenches, vehicles, or individual positions. These are easier to produce and replace, but quality varies, and advertised characteristics do not guarantee results on the front. Without constant updates, even a mass-produced device quickly becomes excess baggage.

This decentralization makes the overall effect more resilient but creates a new burden. Thousands of compatible modules, trained operators, power supply, repairs, and rapid data transmission about new signals are needed. An expensive station was a bottleneck due to its rarity; a network of small jammers becomes a bottleneck due to the complexity of coordination. Russia managed to increase the number of assets but did not eliminate the need to manage them as a unified system.

In this sense, the war repeats the history of Russian unmanned forces. The most successful solutions emerge in individual centers and specialized units, after which the state attempts to scale them across the entire army. During expansion, the average quality of crews inevitably declines, training becomes more complex, and a gap arises between showcase models and what line units actually receive.

Not a Collapse, But a Loss of Monopoly

Russian EW remains dangerous. It is capable of disrupting navigation, reducing drone reliability, interfering with communications and precision weapons, while electronic intelligence helps locate operators and headquarters. To consider it 'destroyed' would be to repeat the mistake of the war's beginning — substituting analysis with a convenient myth. Losses of systems do not equate to the disappearance of the function, and the emergence of fiber optics does not disable all other assets that still depend on the spectrum.

But EW's monopoly on drone defense has disappeared. Against cable control, physical detection and interception are needed. Against autonomous guidance, other sensors and strike assets are required. Against mass FPVs, a combination of camouflage, nets, mobility, fire, and electronic protection is necessary. No single complex, however powerful, can independently cover this range of threats anymore.

Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of the collapse of the 'electronic dome,' but of its disintegration into many short-lived zones. These can be created, shifted, and updated, but they cannot be declared permanently protected. Success is no longer determined by the range of a single station, but by the speed of the cycle: detecting a new signal, understanding it, transmitting data, modifying software, and training crews faster than the adversary can reconfigure.

Russia entered the full-scale war with an advantage in heavy electronic warfare. Mass drones did not destroy this advantage but changed its nature. Now, it exists only where and as long as the system manages to update faster than the threat. In a war where a new frequency or a fiber-optic spool spreads within weeks, even the most powerful shield ages the moment it is activated.