The official version for each of the six assassination attempts is identical: Ukrainian special services, a recruited perpetrator, a confession of guilt, and a life sentence. This version is convenient—it avoids explaining why, over two years, neither the FSB, Rosgvardia, nor military counterintelligence have been able to stop a series of attacks on individuals who theoretically should be the best-protected in the country. However, Western intelligence and The Washington Post are increasingly skeptical—not because Ukraine is definitively uninvolved, but because in at least one case, the explanation “these are SBU saboteurs” openly contradicts the timeline and motive. Moreover, according to a leaked EU intelligence report, Russian security forces themselves openly quarreled at a December 2025 meeting about who was to blame.

Six Assassination Attempts in Two Years

According to a Meduza count published on August 3, 2026, at least six assassination attempts on high-ranking Russian military officials have been recorded deep within Russia since late 2024—not on the front lines, but in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. Igor Kirillov, head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops, died in December 2024 from a bomb attached to a scooter near his home; his assistant also died with him. Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy head of the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate, died in April 2025 when a car exploded in the courtyard of his home in Balashikha. Fanil Sarvarov, head of the General Staff's Operational Training Directorate, died in December 2025 when his car exploded in a Moscow parking lot. Vladimir Alekseev, First Deputy Head of the GRU, was shot in the stairwell of his own home on February 6, 2026, and survived. Azatbek Omurbekov, former commander of the 64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, accused of war crimes in Bucha, became the presumed target of a mailbox explosion in a military town in Khabarovsk Krai in April 2026—the commander of another unit died, while Omurbekov's own fate is not specified in open sources. Finally, on August 1, 2026, there was a presumed assassination attempt on Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander-in-Chief Alexander Chaiko in an explosion at the Balzi Rossi restaurant in Moscow, detailed in a separate report.

Three individuals from this list died, and at least two more survived after serious injuries. In each incident, Russian investigators blamed Ukraine.

Official Version: Ukraine Is to Blame for Everything

In the Kirillov case, Akhmadjon Kurbonov, sentenced to life imprisonment, stated during interrogation that he was recruited by Ukrainian special services and promised a large sum for delivering a scooter with explosives. In the Moskalik case, Ignat Kuzin, identified by investigators as an “agent of Ukrainian special services,” received a life sentence. In one of the episodes related to General Alekseev, the FSB claimed that the suspect was recruited in Ternopil through his son, a Polish citizen. The scheme in all official versions is the same: a local perpetrator, recruitment via messenger or a relative, a confession of guilt, and a verdict.

The problem is that the scheme repeats itself too perfectly—and this in itself has raised questions, including within Russian security structures.

Security Forces' Dispute and Kremlin's Fear

According to an intelligence report from an EU country, obtained by journalists from Vazhnye Istorii and also reviewed by CNN and the Financial Times, the series of assassination attempts sparked an open conflict between General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, and Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov. The catalyst was Sarvarov's killing in December 2025: at a security meeting, Gerasimov sharply criticized Bortnikov for failing to ensure protection against attacks. Bortnikov, in turn, reproached the Ministry of Defense for lacking its own physical security unit for senior command staff, while Zolotov reminded them that Rosgvardia's resources are not intended to protect officers from other agencies. Putin himself had to calm the disputants, after which he instructed the FSO to provide security for Gerasimov and ten other high-ranking Ministry of Defense officers.

The same report, as recounted by the media, concludes that Putin fears a conspiracy by Russian political elites more than Ukrainian attacks: he less frequently attends public events like the Valdai Forum, works for weeks from protected bunkers, and employees working near him are forbidden from using smartphones with internet access or taking public transport. This is not the behavior of someone convinced that all six assassination attempts were orchestrated by an external adversary.

Alekseev and Prigozhin's Shadow

Western intelligence agencies most directly doubted the Ukrainian trace specifically in the Alekseev case. The Washington Post, citing current and former U.S. intelligence officials, reported that the attack occurred amidst peace negotiations—and that striking such a figure at that moment would have been “utter madness” on Ukraine's part, as it risked derailing talks and provoking a sharp reaction from the U.S. administration. According to the publication, a version involving internal Russian reasons appears far more likely.

There is a specific motive for this version. Alekseev participated in negotiations with Yevgeny Prigozhin during the Wagner PMC mutiny in June 2023, publicly called Prigozhin's actions “a stab in the back of the country and the president,” and, according to CNN, maintained contact with him until Prigozhin's death in an August 2023 plane crash—a crash almost unanimously considered by the West to be Kremlin retribution. Russian officials have not publicly confirmed the version of internal causes: Minister Lavrov called the attack an attempt by Ukraine to disrupt negotiations, without providing evidence. Ukraine denies involvement.

Titov, the Widow, and the Personal Revenge Theory

Another incident rarely appears in official lists of assassination attempts precisely because, in essence, there is no official version for it. In August 2025, FSB Lieutenant General Alexey Titov, deputy head of the 5th Service—a unit historically overseeing the post-Soviet space—was injured in a Moscow children's store. Officially, a helium balloon explosion was reported—a version so unconvincing that it became a source of rumors in itself. According to the Telegram channel VChK-OGPU—a source that Russian authorities have neither confirmed nor denied—a device disguised as a gift was handed to Titov by the widow of an FSB officer he knew, who had died several years earlier under unexplained circumstances; the woman herself died in the explosion, while Titov survived but lost his legs.

This version—unlike the story involving Alekseev—has not been confirmed by any publication with an open methodology, only by an anonymous channel, and therefore cannot be considered an established fact. However, even it points in the same direction as The Washington Post's data: not towards saboteurs deployed from beyond the front lines, but towards individuals within the system who had a personal score to settle with a specific general.

Conclusion

None of these narratives individually proves that Russian generals are eliminating each other through their own special services. But taken together, they form a picture that is poorly compatible with the official version of “Ukraine is to blame for everything”: EU intelligence records an open quarrel between the head of the FSB and the Chief of the General Staff, The Washington Post calls the Ukrainian trace “madness” precisely at the moment of peace negotiations, and one of the victims is found to have a personal connection to a person most often called a victim of Kremlin, rather than Ukrainian, revenge—Prigozhin.

There is no official answer to the question of who is truly behind this series—and judging by the fact that Putin had to personally break up his security officials rather than them jointly searching for an external enemy, the Kremlin itself may not have an answer.