In the documents of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, the project was referred to as a production program. For residents of Ukrainian cities, its result is heard as the low hum of an engine before an explosion. In a few years, the Russian site has gone from assembling Iranian kits to mass-producing its own version of the Shahed-136 – a drone that the Russian military calls "Geran-2."

The main story here is not about one unusual microchip. It is about the combination of three resources: Iranian technology, the global market for civilian electronics, and a workforce recruited from students and young foreign women. It is this combination that allowed for a rapid increase in the production of relatively cheap, disposable devices.

We cross-referenced the source material with U.S. sanctions documents, physical research by Conflict Armament Research, calculations by the Institute for Science and International Security, the HUR component database, and journalistic investigations. Several striking technical claims had to be narrowed: the configuration of "Gerans" changes from series to series, and the presence of a modem does not yet equate to full remote control.

From Iranian Supply to Russian Series Production

In the autumn of 2022, Russia began using Shahed-family drones in Ukraine. In November of the same year, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions against companies involved in their transfer. The next stage was no longer the import of finished weapons, but the transfer of production.

In April 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department described a $1.75 billion contract between the Iranian entity Sahara Thunder and the Russian side. A separate sanctions package stated that the Alabuga SEZ had a contract with the Russian military for the assembly of "Geran-2" drones supplied from Iran and was increasing its capacity to produce components within Russia.

Internal documents reviewed by the Institute for Science and International Security showed a plan for 6,000 drones and a three-stage scheme: supply of finished drones, assembly from kits, and transition to the production of airframes and internal components. The project depended on Iranian blueprints, engines, warheads, training, and quality control.

In July 2023, specialists from Conflict Armament Research examined two drones used in Ukraine. Differences in design and components allowed them to conclude that a Russian serial version of the Shahed-136 had appeared. This is more important than any inscription on a fragment: the conclusion was based on physical comparison of samples.

How Many Drones Does Alabuga Produce?

There is no official public reporting from the factory. Therefore, any precise production figures are estimates. The Institute for Science and International Security compared the contract plan with daily reports from the Ukrainian Air Force on launches. According to the institute's calculations, by the end of August 2024, Alabuga could have supplied over 6,000 drones, fulfilling the initial volume approximately one year ahead of schedule.

For January–August 2024, researchers obtained an estimated annual rate of about 4,700 drones. This figure cannot be read as a number confirmed by invoices: the method assumes a link between serial production and the number of drones used. Iranian supplies, stockpiles, and decoys that outwardly resemble Shaheds also influence the statistics.

The correct formula is: mass production is confirmed by several independent data lines, while the specific monthly volume remains an analytical estimate.

Satellite images showed the expansion of production buildings and protected sites. Sanctions documents named Alabuga as the main Russian producer of disposable attack UAVs. Together, these data confirm industrial scale, even if the enterprise's accounting is closed.

What Has Changed Inside the "Geran-2"

The basic design remained recognizable: a delta wing, a pusher piston engine, a pre-programmed route, and a warhead in the nose section. But the Russian version is not a single, unchanging product. Various series, markings, layouts, and experimental components have been found in the wreckage.

The use of multi-channel Kometa-family satellite receivers is most reliably confirmed. Their task is to reduce the impact of interference on navigation. Public materials do not provide grounds to assign all variants the same number of antenna elements or a single precise gain in decibels: different samples were equipped differently.

Trackers and 3G/4G modems with SIM cards were found in some drones. They are capable of transmitting coordinates, connection status, or information about route progress. However, the mere presence of a modem does not imply that the operator continuously pilots the drone via a mobile network. Such a formulation would require data on the communication protocol, server, and control commands.

A HUR diagram published in 2026 shows how far modularity has progressed: a separate series had a camera, a mesh modem, a 12-channel Kometa receiver, a single-board computer, and mobile modems. This is proof of a specific modification, not a specification for all "Geran-2s."

Warheads: Why You Can't Reduce Everything to a Single Figure

Public descriptions often feature a "50-kilogram warhead." This is a convenient approximation, but the examined drones carried different charges. High-explosive fragmentation, combined, and thermobaric variants appeared. Their mass and destructive effect depend on the series.

The original document attributed a precise temperature and pressure to the thermobaric charge without a direct reference to a laboratory report. We removed these figures. What can be reliably stated is that the use of volumetric-detonating mixtures increases danger in enclosed spaces and confined technical facilities, but the specific effect is determined by the charge design and explosion conditions.

Imported Electronics and the Limit of Localization

A Russian airframe does not mean an entirely Russian component base. Conflict Armament Research has repeatedly found foreign-made commercial parts in Iranian and Russian drones. The Washington institute specifically noted the dependence of navigation and anti-jamming modules on imported microelectronics.

Civilian microcontrollers, power converters, and radio components pass through distributors and intermediaries. Such parts are produced in millions and have peaceful applications themselves. Therefore, export control faces not one secret factory, but a distributed supply chain where the ultimate military user is hidden behind several trading companies.

The weak point of the conveyor is not necessarily a unique chip. It is the totality of imported machinery, materials, electronic components, and logistics. Replacing one supplier does not stop production, but complicating access to several classes of parts at once increases the price and slows down design changes.

Who Works on the Assembly Line

A U.S. sanctions release directly linked the SEZ leadership to the use of underage students for drone assembly. Russian investigations described Alabuga Polytech students, long shifts, a system of financial obligations, and a secrecy regime. The documents reviewed also mentioned sending students and employees for training in airframe production.

The second recruitment line is the Alabuga Start program. The Associated Press analyzed satellite images, internal documents, and hundreds of promotional videos, and spoke with six participants. According to AP, about 200 women aged 18–22 came from African countries; some of them said that the advertised program and payment did not correspond to the actual work.

An expert quoted by AP estimated the proportion of program participants who ended up in drone production at approximately 90 percent. This is the interviewee's estimate, not a register of workers. Therefore, it is correct to speak of a documented international recruitment scheme and evidence of unmet expectations, without declaring the circumstances of each participant to be identical.

What Is Proven and What Remains a Version

Russian-Iranian cooperation, Alabuga's contract with the Russian military, the production of a Russian version of the Shahed-136, the involvement of SEZ leaders, and the existence of an international network of payments and supplies are proven. Physical investigations confirm foreign components and design changes.

Monthly production volumes remain estimates. Data on "Kometa," mobile modems, and new warheads pertain to the investigated series, and not automatically to the entire fleet. Claims of a fully radar-absorbent body, guaranteed online control, or a single thermobaric filling for all drones are not confirmed by open sources.

This distinction is important for analysis. Alabuga achieved scale not through a single technological breakthrough, but through the ability to constantly change components and assemble different variants around one cheap platform.

Conclusion: The Conveyor Is Stronger Than a Single Part

The story of the "Geran-2" shows how the military industry adapts the civilian market for mass weaponry. Iran transferred the design and production knowledge. The Russian site organized serial production. Intermediaries ensured the flow of parts, and educational and migration programs provided workers.

The vulnerability of this model is also systemic. It depends on external electronics, materials, logistics, and continuous recruitment of people. But it is erroneous to look for a single button that will stop the entire conveyor. This is no longer a warehouse of imported Shaheds, but a production capable of changing configurations and pace.

Therefore, the main conclusion of the investigation is not about a dispute over range or body color. Alabuga has transformed a foreign project into a reproducible system. To assess its capabilities, one must monitor not a single photograph of wreckage, but simultaneously production buildings, contracts, components, workforce, and application statistics.