The Main Problem with the Previous Version: Confused Chronology

The Eastern Military District (VVO) unites armies and formations from Transbaikal to the Far East. Its units fought near Kyiv, in Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. However, this does not imply that a single commander personally led all operations over several years.

The previous text attributed decisions made near Kyiv in spring 2022 to Alexander Chaiko, and simultaneously, the assaults on Pavlivka and Vuhledar in autumn 2022 – winter 2023. By that time, the command of both the grouping and the district had already changed. This error undermined the entire dossier.

The second figure in the original version — "Major General Sergei Viktorovich Medvedev" — was named the commander of the 29th and 58th Armies, the organizer of battles near Vuhledar, and a participant in a corruption scheme. The cited sources do not confirm such a biography or this individual's connection to the specified operations. The personal block has been entirely removed.

Who is Alexander Chaiko?

Alexander Chaiko was born on July 27, 1971. He held positions as commander of the 20th Army, chief of staff of the Central Military District, commander of the Russian grouping in Syria, and commander of the Eastern Military District troops. Russian official materials showed him in Ukraine in March 2022 during the awarding of military personnel.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, in May 2026, Chaiko was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces. Prior to this, from June 2025, he served as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The appointment was confirmed by an official biographical reference cited by Interfax.

Kyiv Oblast: Area of Strongest Attribution

A joint investigation by the Associated Press and FRONTLINE linked Chaiko to the command of Russian forces advancing on Kyiv from the northwest. Journalists established his presence in the village of Zdvizhivka, Bucha district, and correlated the command structure, documents, and testimonies regarding the actions of subordinate units.

The investigation described systematic detentions, torture, killings, and looting of homes in territories controlled by Russian troops. The authors did not limit themselves to the general principle of 'the commander is responsible for everything'; they sought orders, repeated practices, and a connection between headquarters and actions on the ground.

Ukrainian law enforcement agencies separately brought charges against Chaiko related to planning the invasion of northern Ukraine. In 2022, the SBU announced the referral of an indictment to court. This represents the position of the Ukrainian investigation; there is no international court verdict that has entered into force in the sources.

Moshchun: Established Operation, Unestablished Personal Orders

VVO units participated in the advance towards Kyiv and battles near the Irpin River. The Ukrainian flooding of the floodplain and the defense of the Moshchun area complicated the Russian advance. However, the original article, without citation, attributed a specific order for a pontoon crossing and over 1500 deaths in this particular battle to Chaiko.

Open sources allow linking Chaiko to the overall command in the direction, but do not confirm these precise formulations. Command responsibility for an operation and authorship of a specific engineering solution are different claims and require different levels of evidence.

Pavlivka and Vuhledar: Same Troops, Different Command

In autumn 2022, the 155th Marine Infantry Brigade participated in heavy fighting for Pavlivka. Servicemen of the brigade complained about significant losses; the Russian Ministry of Defense denied their scale. In February 2023, the 155th and 40th Brigades, units of the 29th and 36th Armies of the VVO, and other formations attacked again near Vuhledar.

ISW linked command-related complaints from Russian military bloggers to Rustam Muradov, commander of the 'Vostok' (East) Grouping, and other commanders of that period. Chaiko was no longer the individual to whom open sources attributed operational leadership of the Vuhledar campaign. Therefore, accusing him of ordering these assaults is incorrect.

Losses of Far Eastern units were significant. However, the BBC investigation's estimate of over 2100 personnel refers to the 155th and 40th Brigades combined and includes killed, missing, and seriously wounded over an extended period of fighting. It is not a death toll and is not tied to a single three-day assault.

Why a Commander Cannot Be Judged Solely by Unit Geography

A formation retains its affiliation with a military district even when operationally subordinate to a different grouping. The district commander is responsible for training, manning, and a range of personnel decisions, while the grouping commander is responsible for a specific operation. In practice, authorities may overlap, but a researcher must establish the period and chain of command.

This is precisely why the phrase 'a VVO unit fought near Vuhledar' is not equivalent to 'Chaiko ordered the assault.' There must be a confirmed position on the date, operational subordination, and data regarding the decision.

What Was Removed from the Dossier

Statements regarding the falsification of maps for the Kremlin, extortion of money from commanders, 'General Medvedev's' real estate, direct authorization for looting, 1500 deaths near Moshchun, and the transfer of materials to the International Criminal Court have been excluded. The original compilation lacked documents confirming these assertions.

Also excluded is the episode involving an explosion in a Moscow restaurant in August 2026. Reports that Chaiko might have been the target remained a version and do not help assess his command decisions.

Conclusion

The most substantiated part of Chaiko's dossier pertains to Kyiv Oblast in spring 2022: his command role, presence in the area, and the investigated practices of subordinate forces are confirmed by several types of sources. Ukrainian criminal prosecution should be described as an accusation, not a verdict.

The battles for Pavlivka and Vuhledar demonstrate heavy losses for VVO formations but belong to a different period of command. Separating these narratives makes the investigation more precise: it retains provable claims against Chaiko and does not attribute decisions to him merely because Far Eastern units participated in the operation.